University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications

Political Science, Department of

4-1983

The Ideology and Praxis of Shi'ism in the Iranian Revolution
Shahrough Akhavi
University of South Carolina - Columbia, akhavi@sc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/poli_facpub
Part of the Political Science Commons

Publication Info
Published in Comparative Studies in Society and History, Volume 25, Issue 2, 1983, pages 195-221.
http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=css
© 1983 by Cambridge University Press

This Article is brought to you by the Political Science, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

The Ideology and Praxis of Shi'ism
in the IranianRevolution
SHAHROUGH

AKHAVI

University of South Carolina
The Iranianrevolution of 1979 presents a case in which religion has stimulated profound social change, ratherthan serving only as a basis for social
integration.Although scholarshave recentlybeen remindedof the revolutionary potentialof religious commitments, the view thatreligion tends to inhibit
large-scale social change continues to enjoy currency. It may be that, in the
light of events in Iranin the last five years, observersof Islamic societies will
now be temptedto overstressthe revolutionarytendencies of that great world
religion. Yet it is difficult to exaggeratethe force and depth of feeling which
Shi'i belief and practicehas generatedin Iranfor the purposeof the structural
transformationof society.
There is, however, the risk of reifying the concept of Shi'ism, andthus care
must be taken to identify the most importantaspects in both the doctrinal/
ideological and the practical/behavioraldimensions. What frequently has
been termed Shi'ism in recent commentaryon Iraniansociety and politics has
perhapsled us into the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Behind the concept
lurkelements of real political, social, and economic life. We need to focus on
the fact that human beings are attributingvarying meanings to Shi'ism, and
the observer must identify the diverse individuals and groups for whom the
point of referenceis Shi'ism in all theirintellectualand organizationalvariety.
The conclusion of this articleis thatShi'ism can andhas meantdifferentthings
to different social actors. Its adepts and practitionersin both the prerevolutionaryand revolutionaryperiods have demonstratedvarietiesof thoughtand
action almost such as to require the use of terms like "polycentrism" to
characterizeShi'ism.
THE QUESTION

OF MODELS

The literatureon the historical and political sociology of Iran has generated
several models which may be useful in helping us to understandthe role of the
This study was originally presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, New York, New York, 3-6 September 1981. I am grateful to the following colleagues for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this article: ErvandAbrahamian,
George E. Delury, Nikki R. Keddie, Houshang E. Chehabi, and M. CrawfordYoung.
I Guenter Lewy, Religion and Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974).
0010-4175/83/2186-0426 $2.50 ? 1983 Society for ComparativeStudy of Society and History
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state in the country's social evolution. Soviet scholars surveying the various
eras of Iranianhistoryhave tendedto apply class analysisbased on changes in
the mode of production.2A second attemptto provide an appropriatemodel
for the study of the Iranianstate centers on the applicationof the concept of
patrimonialism.This effort stresses the absence of feudal forms and structures
in an otherwise basically medieval authoritariansystem.3 A third model,
directed more specifically at the nineteenth-centuryIranian state but with
importantimplications for its twentieth-centurycounterpart,focuses on the
concept of oriental despotism. This last effort is more satisfying than that
listed first above because the analystbringsgreatersensitivityto the empirical
evidence.4 Somewhat along the same lines, other specialists have directed
attentionto the phenomenonof the rentier state "whose suddenacquisitionof
enormous revenue sources leads to its hypertrophy...."5 More recently,
dissatisfactionwith existing models in the literaturehas led one observerto
advance "bourgeois monarchicalcapitalism" as a substitutein the belief in
its greaterexplanatoryvalue.6
One is struckby the usefulness of most of these models. The Soviet interest
in identifyingdifferentstages in the evolution of modes of productionhas the
advantage of reminding us that the subject matter can best be approached
within the frameworkof political economy. The stress on patrimonialism,in
its turn, is of great interestinasmuchas it suggests the absenceof intermediate
autonomousgroups with legal prerogativesof their own to defend and promote their interests. Oriental despotism, especially in the amalgamationof
both variants (Marx's stress on "weak society" and Engels's emphasis on
"strong state"), is of great importancefor the analysis of the Pahlavi state.
The concept of the rentier state suggests excessive growth in one sectorhere, petroleum-at the expense of others and the evolution of a brittle and
fragile sociopolitical and economic infrastructurethat appears deceptively
intact until fundamentallychallenged.
It is at this point that I would like to advance the notion of corporatism.
This concept permitsan understandingof the natureof the statein termsof the
dimensions of political participationand legitimacy. The impact of any state
2 Ahmad Ashraf, "Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran," in
Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East, Michael Cook, ed. (London: Oxford
University Press, 1970), 308-32.
3 James A. Bill, "Class Analysis and the Dialectics of Modernizationin the Middle East,"
InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies, 3:4 (October 1972), 417-34.
4 ErvandAbrahamian,"OrientalDespotism: The Case of QajarIran," InternationalJournal
of Middle East Studies, 5:1 (January1974), 3-31.
5 M. CrawfordYoung, personalcommunication.For the Iranianexample, see Hossein Mahdavy, "Patternsand Problemsof Economic Developmentin RentierStates:The Case of Iran," in
Studies in Economic History, Cook, ed., 428-67.
6 Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1979),
38-63.

SHI'ISM IN THE IRANIAN

REVOLUTION

197

on its society will be in relation to the degree of its legitimacy among members of the political community, as well as according to the natureof their
participationin politics. A loose form of corporatism(lacking the historic
features of Gleichschaltung associated with Europeancorporatesystems of
the 1930s and 1940s) was the historical solution of the Pahlavi state
(1926-1979). In the end, corporatism led to the bureaucratizationof the
state's power and of the regime attemptsto control mass participation.In the
formulationof public policy, the objective of MuhammadRiza Pahlavi, shah
since 1941, was to maximize the people's supportfor the state and minimize
their demands upon it.7
In corporatestate systems, interestsare centeredin units thatare "singular,
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered,functionallydifferentiated." The state creates such units and licenses them to provide a monopoly
of representationin designated functionalareas. There is, however, no question of such units, once licensed, becoming free of the state. In fact, they must
observe limits upon their activity which are set by the state throughconstitutional, statutory,or administrativecodes.8 Such arrangementsare well suited
to the strategy of maximizing supportswhile minimizing demands. And although the Pahlavi state was not able to mobilize power to the degree that
some have suggested, it did have formidablerepressive capacity when the
regime chose to apply repression.
Yet, the corporatism advanced by the Pahlavi state contained a critical
weakness. In an area of the world where the religious basis of political
legitimacy is of centralimportance,the Pahlavistate so excluded Shi'ism that
it failed to gain religiously sanctionedmoral acceptance. Nor did the regime
come even remotely close to meshing its corporatiststructurewith the salvationist yearningsof Shi'ites-especially the petite bourgeoisieand those at the
bottom of the economic pyramid. In both prospectand retrospectone can see
thatthis failurewas due to two things:the coextensiveness of the religious and
political spheres in Islam, and the abidingdeterminationof IranianShi'ites to
withholdtheir approvalfrom the shah's claim to legitimacy. This is not to say
that Shi'i doctrine categorically rejects the legitimacy of all temporalrulers.
However, at best, the authorityof such a ruleris subjectto review, and it may
be denied entirely; the precept that awards ultimate legitimate rule to the
7 Myron Weiner, "Political Participation," in Crises and Sequences of Political Development, LeonardBinder, ed. (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, 1971), 161.
8 Philip C. Schmitter, "Still the
Centuryof Corporatism?"in TheNew Corporatism,Frederick Pike and Thomas Stritch, eds. (Notre Dame: Universityof Notre Dame Press, 1974), 93-94.
As Houshang Chehabi has pointed out, classical corporatism features-in the case of authoritariantypes of corporatism-very strictvertical integrationof capitalistsand laborby branch
of activity. In the Iraniancase, such rigorous integrationdid not exist, althoughthe regime had
begun this process in the 1960s so that, by the time of the revolution, one could speak of it in
embryo.
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Imam alone has been utilized as doctrinaljustificationfor rebellionagainstan
impious ruler.9
The Pahlavivariantof corporatismwas structurallyflawed in consequence.
A wide gap existed between the corporatistorganizationof the economy and
political life, on the one hand, and the continued if enfeebled ability of the
religious forces to resist cooptationinto the institutionsof the Pahlavi system
on the other. Through this gap were to pour the revolutionary masses,
eventually overthrowingthe old regime and initiatinga new state order that
remains difficult to categorize.
THE STRUCTURE

OF PAHLAVI

CORPORATISM

The structureof Pahlavi corporatismcan best be illuminatedby discussion of
its institutionsand public policies. This dual emphasis will highlight matters
of organizationand social mobility.
There is consensus that the Iranianpolitical system from the time of World
War II took on the following forms: 1941-53, pluralistpolitics; 1953-63,
authoritarianmobilizationpolitics; 1963-79, monarchicalabsolutismand bureaucratizationof power. Although the features of the last period had their
origin and development in the earlieryears, this discussion will focus on the
final period of the shah's rule.
During these sixteen years the major institutions of the state were the
monarchy, the intelligence services, the military, the centralplanning apparatus, and certainkey ministries, such as interiorand information.There was
a party structure,but it remainedan ancillaryfeatureof the regime and failed
in its purposeto mobilize masses and intellectualsbehind the shah's "White
Revolution."
The centralrole of the monarchyis so obvious and has so often been cited'?
9 A debate is taking place in the literatureon the question of doctrinalprinciples and rule.
Arguing in the traditionthat the doctrine sanctions clergy assertivenessand revolutionaryrejection of impious rule (zulm) are A. K. S. Lambton, "Quis CustodietCustodes?"StudiaIslamica,
5:2 (1956), 125-48, and 6:1 (1956), 125-46; Nikki R. Keddie, "The Roots of the 'Ulama"s
Power in Modem Iran," StudiaIslamica, 29 (1969), 31-53; HamidAlgar, Religion and State in
Iran, 1785-1906 (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1969); LeonardBinder, "The Proofs
of Islam," in Studies in Honor of Hamilton A. R. Gibb, George Makdisi, ed. (Leiden: Brill,
1965), 118-40; and JosephEliash, "The Ithna"ashariShi'i JuristicTheoryof Politicaland Legal
Authority," Studia Islamica, 29 (1969), 17-30. In a later article, "Some MisconceptionsConcerning Shi'i Political Theory," InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies, 9:1 (February
1979), 9-25, Eliash admonishesagainsttoo literalan interpretationof Shi'i doctrineon zulm. As
against the traditionalview, the revisionists suggest that Shi'i doctrinehas been quietisticon the
question of rule. Consult Said Amir Arjomand, "Religion, Political Action and Legitimate
Domination in Shi'ite Iran: Fourteenthto EighteenthCenturies A.D." Archives europeenes de
sociologie, 20:1 (1979), 59-109; and Mangol Bayat, "Islam in Pahlaviand Post-PahlaviIran:A
CulturalRevolution?" in Islam and Development:Religion and Sociopolitical Change, John L.
Esposito, ed. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1980), 89-94.
10 LeonardBinder, Iran: Political Developmentin a ChangingSociety (Berkeley:University
of CaliforniaPress, 1962); James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill, 1972); Richard Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, 2d ed.
(Pittsburgh:University of PittsburghPress, 1979); Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran
(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1971).
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that not much need be added beyond the note that whereas the country's
constitution(1906-7) stipulatedthat the shah reign-not rule-the actions of
this shah since 1953 were in full disregardof these provisions. Though his
military-basedmonarchymay not have become an arrant"fascist-style totalitarianregime," I his manipulationof politics resultedin the gross violation
of the country's fundamentallaw.
The identificationof the state with the monarchy, if not with the personof
the shah, became the key objective of this ruler. He used the securityservices
and the army to ensure his purpose, and the proliferationof agencies within
the military-securityestablishmentto accomplish his ends should cause less
surprisethan the fact that internalrivalries among chiefs of agencies did not
surface more often than they did. Of the numerous units, "four [were] in
some ways overt police units, and the other four [performed]various intelligence and secret police functions."12
Since militarypower alone is insufficient and inefficient in administeringa
society, the army, police, and intelligence services did not serve as day-to-day
instrumentsof rule. The shah had to rely upon a socioeconomic program
which government language characterizedas progressive and even "revolutionary." Because the state in many societies can mobilize such extensive
power, it often becomes the paramountentrepreneur,as well. The shah's
third, fourth, and fifth development plans (1962-79) were the major instruments of nationalintegration.The expansionof the nationalmarket,underthe
aegis of nationalplanning, into the peripherywas an orchestratedeffort that
led to the sedentarizationof the tribes, the capitalizationof agriculture,the
emergence of a massive oil sector, and the growth of a modest, if internationally uncompetitive, manufacturingsector. As partof this system, two new
classes came into increasing evidence: the middle class and the industrial
working class.
In the 1960s and 1970s the regime destroyedthe autonomyof the organizations of these two classes. Such organizationshad alreadybegun to emergeby
the 1920s, and the labor movement had been a vital part of the Iranian
political scene up to mid century, with membershipapproachinghalf a million. 13 After his reinstatementon the throne in 1953, the shah reactedto the
power of the working-class organizations by creating official unions that
became integratedinto the Pahlavi state. The Ministry of Labor, moreover,
had less to do with the organizationalaspects of these unions than did the
secret police. 14 As for the middle class, it did not enjoy independence,even
though as a group it benefited a good deal from the modernizationpolicies of

II Ervand Abrahamian, "The StructuralCauses of the Iranian Revolution," Middle East
Research and InformationProject Reports, 87 (May 1980), 25.
12
Halliday, Iran, 76.
13 ErvandAbrahamian,Iran between TwoRevolutions(Princeton:Princeton
UniversityPress,
1982), 347-71.
14 Halliday, Iran, 205.
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the shah. That this class acquiescedto, but withoutparticipatingin, decisions
of the regime derived from its gains in growth from the industrialization
policies. Deprivedof decision-makingauthorityfor its institutions,especially
the syndicatesand the Chamberof Commerce,the middle class could not take
the initiative on broad policy issues.15 But this did not matter as long as
members of this class, as individuals, continued to enjoy prosperity.
In summary, the Pahlavi state seemed patternedafter corporatepolitical
systems, a chief trait of which is to keep access to the levers of power
restrictedto a small elite while establishinga hierarchicalfacade thatpurports
to organize broadmass participationin endeavorsof public choice. In evolving the corporatestructure,an ideology was fashionedwhich in its pronouncements stressed distributionbut which in practice favored production.
This leads, then, to the question of which groupsbenefitedmost from such
policies and which lost the most? The capitalistmiddleclass was probablythe
most direct beneficiary of these policies. This was largely related to the
phenomenal increase of oil revenues after 1973, but it was also linked to
deliberateadministrativedecisions alreadyadoptedin the previous decade to
push hardfor the consolidationof the middle-class, which had emergedin the
1930s. The spreadof the industrialand foreign trademarketsin the following
decades led to the rise of a more clearly identifiablemiddle class, which the
shah intended to make the social basis of his state while simultaneously
denying it real decision-making authority. A corporategroup of financiers,
investors, traders, and industrialiststhus arose as a consequence of over-all
economic growth in Iran.
The investmentratio is a good general index of sectoralgrowth, and in the
years 1962 through 1973 (the period of the third and fourth development
plans), vast sums were channeled by the governmentinto the economic sectors. Supplementing that effort was investment by private entrepreneurs,
whose total investments amountedto "some two-thirdsto three-quartersas
much as the public sector .. ."16
The relatively favorableposition of privateentrepreneursmay also be seen
from figures on expendituresby urbanfamilies, as shown in Table 1. These
data were generatedby the CentralBank of Iran, and are arrangedto show
expenditureper populationdecile, rankedaccordingto wealth. While expenditure figures are not as useful as those on income distribution, they are
revealing. The 1973-74 statistics show that the richest 10 percent of the
populationaccounted for 38 percent of the total expendituresof the population, whereas the poorest 10 percent accounted for only 1.3 percent.17
15
Bill, Politics of Iran, 53-72.
16 Charles Issawi, "The IranianEconomy, 1925-1975: Fifty Years of Economic Development," in Iran under the Pahlavis, George Lenczowski, ed. (Stanford: Hoover Institution,
1978), 137.
17 Data for the United States in 1978 indicatethatthe
top two quintilesshowed aboutthe same
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TABLE 1

Distribution of Urban Expenditure in Iran, by Decile
Percentage of expenditure
Decile
(lowest to highest)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

1959-60

1973-74

1.7%
2.9
4.0
5.0
6.1
7.3
8.9
11.8
16.4
35.3

1.3%
2.4
3.4
4.7
5.0
6.8
9.3
11.1
17.5
37.9

SOURCE: ErvandAbrahamian,"The StructuralCauses of the IranianRevolution," Middle East
Research and InformationProject Reports, 87 (May 1980), 23. See also for confirmation,Firouz
Vakil, "Iran's Basic Economic Problems: A Twenty Year Horizon," Economic Development
and Cultural Change, 25:4 (July 1977), 723-25.

Figures for a single case are indicative, but a comparativeperspective is
more helpful. In a recent essay,18 the discrepancybetween rich and poor in
Iranunder the shah is shown to have been greaterthan that in Egypt, where
the economy has been historicallyweak. The data, shown in Table 2, are not
strictly comparable because the figures for Egypt are based on the years
1964-65 (cf. Iran, 1968) and households in both rural and urbanareas are
included (cf. Iran, urbanhouseholds only). Yet, the statistics are of interest,
particularlysince poverty would tend to be reflectedmore in the ruralareasin
any case. These figures representthe situationin the late 1960s, but it has also
been suggested that they markedan ongoing trendsuch that in Iranunderthe
second Pahlavi shah "the rich got richer and the poor got poorer."19
The capitalist middle class also included farmerswho benefited from the
land reformpolicies of the shah. The regime's critics sometimeshave ignored
the accomplishmentsof its land reform. It is appropriateto note that, by the
end of the reformin 1971, the numberof those who owned no land priorto the
skew as that for Iran in 1973-74. However, the middle quintile in the case of the United States
revealed a figure of 17.5 percent of expenditures, whereas in the Iraniancase the analogous
statistic was 11.8 percent, "suggesting the old 'small middle class equals low stability' equation." I am grateful to George E. Delury for bringing this fact to my attention.
18 Elias Tuma, "The Rich and the Poor in the Middle East," Middle East Journal, 34:4
(Autumn 1980), 420.
19 Gholam A. Liaghat, "Changes in a New Middle Class through the Analysis of Census
Data: The Case of Iranbetween 1956-1966," Middle East Journal, 34:3 (Summer 1980), 349.
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TABLE 2

Income Distribution in Iran and Egypt (in percentage)
Percentage of income
Decile
(poorest to richest)

Iran, 1968
(urban)

Egypt, 1964-65
(urban and rural)

1
2
3
4

1.2
2.8
3.8
4.9

1.5
3.1
4.2
5.3

5
6
7
8

5.9
7.2
8.8
11.0

6.5
8.1
10.1
12.8

9
10

14.7
39.7

17.3
31.1

29.7
0.5018

19.2
0.4337

Wealthiest 5% of population
Gini coefficient

Elias Tuma, "The Rich and the Poor in the Middle East," Middle East Journal, 34:4
(Autumn 1980), 420.

SOURCE:

reform and became owners as a result amounted to 15 percent of the total
numberof landowners.20
The groups that lost most heavily under the shah's programs were the
tribes, the poor peasantry, the petite bourgeoisie (bazaarmerchants, shopkeepers, and artisans), and the urbanpoor (low-income industrialworkers,
self-employed-such as taxi drivers-and the lumpenproletariat).It will be
noted that the landed aristocracy is not included in this list of losers. The
reasonis thatthis class was invited, on termsfavorableto it, to become partof
the urbanmiddle class of industrialists,financiers, and entrepreneurs,or, if
they wished to remain in the countryside, to become partnersin the large
state-regulatedagribusinessfarmsthat were spreadingthroughoutthe country
after the mid 1960s. The structuraltransformationof the Iraniancountryside
in the 1960s and 1970s which resulted from the capitalizationof agriculture
did not shift power from large landownersto the Iranianequivalentof a selfsufficient small-holder yeomanry. Instead, "land [was] transferredonly to
some peasants, while power in the village [was] to a greatextent appropriated
by the state."21
20

Nikki R. Keddie, "The IranianVillage before and after Land Reform," Journal of ContemporaryHistory, 3:3 (1968), 87.
21
Halliday, Iran, 122. Halliday's italics.
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But of course the one stratumof society whose downwardmobility under
the shah was most consequentialfor the collective social action that led to the
revolution was the clergy. The bureaucratizationof power was accompanied
by the seizure of the clergy's jobs, lands, revenues, madrasahs (theological
colleges), and administrationof shrines. The process of declassing the clergy
might have succeeded if the shah had not insisted upon appropriatingthe
clergy's last remaining resource: "the cultural symbols which in the past
[had] been so vital in inculcating among Iraniansa sense of self, an explanation of the cosmos and social reality."22 The masses that the clergy mobilized, therefore, were not only socially, economically, and politically deprived, but also culturally alienated.
THE SHI'I

DOCTRINE

OF AUTHORITY

AND

THE

STATE

The Shi'i position is based on the following beliefs: (1) Muhammad, the
prophet of Islam, should be succeeded by his descendents, the imams; (2)
salvation is vouchsafed to those who believe in the restorationof God's
justice, to be accomplishedby the last Imam when he reappearson earth;(3)
every historical period requires a "proof" of God, incarnatein the line of
these descendants.
IranianShi'ites are known as Imamitesor Twelvers. The ImamiteShi'ites
believe that the prophet'srightfulheirs were twelve in number.Only the first
in this line, 'Ali, actually ruled and then only briefly (A.D. 651-56). The
others were persecuted as a matter of official policy by the rulers of the
Islamic community. The social mythos of Shi'ism suggests that blame for the
deathof their imams must be placed at the door of the Sunnicaliphs who ruled
the Islamic world at that time, even though there is historical evidence that
some imams did not die a violent death.
The practical role of the imams, except for 'Ali, consisted in spiritual
guidance. The last Imam is believed to have disappearedas a child in the year
A.D. 874. The faithful anticipate his return as the "One Who Arises, the
Masterof the Age, the Mahdi." His reappearancewill requitethe apocalyptic
visions and expectations of the true believers.
The doctrineof the Imamate-or rule by the Imam-addresses itself to the
occultation of the twelfth Imam. Shi'ites must accept the fact of his absence
for an indefiniteperiod of history;yet, the doctrinespecifies thatevery historical age must featurea proof of God manifestedin the Imam. It became a part
of the doctrine, therefore, that the twelfth Imam maintainedcontact with his
followers despite his phenomenal absence from the community.
The clergy argued that the occultation of the Imam did not mean that the
proof of God did not exist. They maintainedthat God commandedthe Imam
22 ShahroughAkhavi, Religion and Politics in ContemporaryIran: Clergy-State Relations in
the Pahlavi Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 183.
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into hiding because of fear that he would be killed. Because the Imam was
obeying the will of God, and God meantthatthereneed be a proof of Him for
every age, then the proof must be construedto exist. The complex logic is
capturedin the following explanation:
Theexistenceof the [proof]was necessarybecausethe non-existence
of the Imam
? . . would have meant the . . . end of the religious injunctions, because the latter

wouldhavenoprotector.Butif he .. .went intooccultation
of God,
by thecommand
and if he had the knownmeansof mediation,then the proofcontinuedon earth,
did
becausebothhe andthemeansof mediationwerepresent.Thestateof occultation
not invalidatethe presenceof the proof. .. 23
But what role was assumedby the clergy apartfrom articulationof Imamite
doctrine?Graduallyand indirectly, they became the transmittersof the sayings, traditions, and practices of the imams and thus assumed the role of
intermediarybetween the latter and the faithful. The emphasis must be upon
the word "indirectly," because there is no doctrinalbasis for arguingthatthe
highest rankingclergymen, the mujtahids,received a categoricalappointment
from the imams themselves in their lifetimes to be the imams' replacements.
Nevertheless, in a much laterperiod, aroundthe seventeenthcentury,tampering with the doctrinalprinciples appearsto have occurredin orderto make it
seem as though a categorical, ex ante, appointmentof mujtahidshad been
grantedby the imams.24
The Imam's occultationalso posed the dilemmaof authority.If the community was to be organized, administered,and preservedaccordingto a pattern
that would be pleasing to God, then who was to lead? On this question the
Imamitesmay be said to have equivocated. As long as they lived underSunni
rule, they were absolved from answering.The absenceof a requirementfor an
oath of allegiance (bay'ah) to the hidden Imam until his reappearancepermitted Shi'ites to be faithful and yet also acknowledge the rule of the Sunni
caliph. However, after 1501, Imamite Shi'ism became the religion of a centralized Iranianstate under the Safavid shahs (1501-1722). It became more
and more urgentto discuss whetheror not the clergy had doctrinalgroundsfor
claiming the deputyshipof the imams as secular shahs now began pressing
such claims themselves.
Moreover, in the eighteenthcenturyan intraclergydisputeresultedin a key
victory on the doctrinalside for those who wanted an assertive social role for
the clergy. The victorious faction successfully arguedthat the mujtahidswere
entitledto use their independentjudgmentin interpretingthe law. A doctrinal
principleconsequentlycame to be used as a lever for clergy activism in social
23 Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, Islamic Messianism: The Idea of Mahdi in TwelverShi'ism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 105.
24 Ibid., 101. Eliash, "Some Misconceptions," has shown that ex ante appointmentnever
occurred.
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matters beyond the narrow compass of ethical and pietistic concerns of the
past. On this view, as againstthat which insisted no room existed for independent judgment, authoritativeopinions (fatwas) could now be issued anathematizing secular policies. Empowered with this prerogative,the clergy became a corporate stratum whose leaders-the mujtahids-could expect
imitationby the masses in practicaland legal matters.The most distinguished
of the mujtahids soon came to exercise great informal political influence.
During the time of the Qajar shahs (1796-1925), the clergy began to claim
that the eminent mujtahidsof the age were, in fact, the proofs of the Imam.
This doctrinal shift ensued from tampering with tradition, but the clergy
mentallyjustified the slight-of-hand,no doubt, on groundsof the increasingly
intolerableacts of their secular rulers.
What is interesting in all this is that at the time the centralized state was
created in sixteenth-centuryIran, the clergy were the state's clients. The
creationof Shi'ism as a state religion in the 1500s was not due to influence of
the mujtahidsbut ratherto the decision of a Sufi leader respondingto chiliastic expectationsrife in northwestIranand easternTurkey. Having conquered
the territoryof Iran, this individualbegan then to importShi'ite mujtahidsinto
Iran to serve in the administrationof the state. Clearly, then, these clergy
were dependent upon and vulnerable to the granting or withdrawalof the
state's largesse and the maneuveringsof the shah. In due course, many of
even the top-rankingclergymen who were already inside the country were
brought into the state bureaucracy.Only a minority of the mujtahidsin this
period maintaineda preferredaloofness from state service.
Doctrinally, the religious leaders legitimated Safavid temporalrule by acquiescing in the claims made by the shahs to be the descendentsof the seventh
Imam, an acquiescence which addedweight to the Safavids' claim to be rulers
of the community. These shahs came to be known by the sobriquetappropriated by them, and not contested then by the clergy-zillullah, the shadow of
God.
The increasing involvement of the clergy in politics in the most recent two
centurieshas had to do with a variety of causes, not all of them doctrinal.For
instance, the increasing penetrationof imperialismled the clergy to forge an
alliance with intellectuals, artisans, and merchants.This political activism of
the clergy did not amount to categorical challenges to the sovereignty of the
shahs. The ruler continued to be regardedas an imperfectleader, and clergy
protest was for the most part confined to very specific grievances against
unjust decisions affecting local interests.25
When a strong mujtahidchallenge to the shah did occur in 1891-92 over
the grant of a tobacco monopoly to the British, the shah quickly capitulated.
But even then his sovereign authoritywas not in jeopardy. A decade later,
25

Algar, Religion and State, passim.
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during the constitutionalrevolution (1905-11), the strongerdoctrinalargument rested with anticonstitutionalistclergymen.
Nevertheless, Shi'i doctrinecontains implicitjustificationfor clergy assertiveness. First, they have the residual right to warn the community of the
violation of the Imam's justice. Second, doctrinal justifications could be
found for political action in the Qur'an, for example, "You are the best
community I have sent forth among the people, commandingthe good and
enjoining from evil," and "O you who believe, obey God, obey the prophet
and those in authorityamong you." Enforcing good and preventingevil are
seen as ultimately political acts which the entire communitymay undertake.
"Those in authorityamong you" are consideredby Shi'ites to be the imams
and even, some believe, the mujtahids.
In no sense, however, did the clergy advance doctrinal arguments for
locating sovereignty in their own corporategroup. When they perceived that
their secular allies in the constitutionalrevolutionwere moving towardWestern notions of popularsovereigntyand republicanism,the clergy defected and
ultimatelysponsoredthe rise to the throneof a militaryofficer who appeared
to be willing to strengthenthe cause of Shi'ism. It was thus ironic that this
individual was to embark upon a series of policies which in fact led to the
eviscerationof the religious institution.Three generationslater, however, the
successors of these clergy would lead perhapsthe most astoundingrevolution
in modern times.
Is there an Islamic theory of collective action?Fromthe Sunni perspective,
the fundamentalunit of social reality is the communityof believers. Collective social action is conceived in terms of salvation, and the charismaof the
communityis the key to its attainment.The importanceof communitycharisma and infallibilitymay be seen in the verse alreadycited-"You are the best
community. .. . "-and

in the saying, attributed to the prophet, "My com-

munity shall never agree upon error."
Collective social action against constitutedauthorityis sanctionedonly in
the event of a ruler's impiety, but unanimouslyacceptedcriteriaby which to
assess the rule of princes do not exist. Moreover, no machineryevolved for
use in applying sanctions against impious rulers. There is only the general
guideline in the Qur'anthat "there is no duty of obedience in sin."26
In fact, revolution is consideredultimatelya threatto the will of God. The
concept of God's community cannot be faulty, for it is based upon membership of believers who have accepted rule over animals and plants as a trust
from Him; it is organizedby those whom God has sent forthto be the leaders
of mankind. Even if a ruler be impious, the danger of revolution to the
community is so great that overridingproof of derelictionis requiredbefore
26 BernardLewis, "Islamic Concepts of Revolution," in Revolutionin the MiddleEast, P. J.
Vatikiotis, ed. (London: Weidenfeld, 1972), 33.
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action is taken. In the absence of such proof, inaction may be preferable
because a rulercannot transcendthe limits of his own mortality,and thus the
situation can improve.
In the Shi'i view of collective social action, the charismaof the community
is replaced by that of the Imam. Salvation is guaranteedonly through the
implementationof the Imam's justice. The Imam "was entitled to political
leadershipas much as to religious authority, [although]his imamatedid not
depend upon his actual rule."27 Moreover, the mujtahids, as a result of the
eighteenth-centurytriumph noted above, have played a role that the Sunni
clergy have forsaken:they exercise power to issue fatwas on crucial political
issues.
Collective social action in the Iranianrevolution is best seen in terms of
both the ideal and materialinterestsof those participatingin it. The essentially
Tocquevillean explanationof increasing general prosperitycombined with a
sudden change in the fortunes of a pivotal social force (here, the capitalist
middle class, which began defecting from the regime in the mid 1970s as
massive armspurchasesled to a credit squeeze which severely restrictedtheir
borrowingcapability, a liquiditycrisis, and nationalborrowingin the international financial markets) goes some way to illuminate the weakness of the
regime. Growing class conflict can be seen in the increase in the numberof
industrialstrikes and incidents of laborturmoilin the 1970s over the previous
decade. But indispensableto a properunderstandingof the Iranianrevolution
is the Weberiannotion that, in gauging interests,ideas mustbe seen to play an
autonomous role.
Yet, it would be a mistake to believe that the revolution stemmed from
mobilizationthroughthe doctrinalprinciples of official Shi'ism. Though the
revolution was led by a grand mujtahid,the AyatalluahRuhullahal-Musavi
Khumayni, due emphasis must be given to the popular or folk aspects in
considering its religious basis. On this dimension, the rituals, passion plays,
and narrativeaccountsof the lives of the imamsoccupied a centralplace in the
social drama. These rituals do not have inherent meanings. Instead, such
meanings are attributed-as Weber argues-to the ritualsby the actors in the
drama. Within this framework, though Iranianswere mobilized by one of
Shi'ism's highest rankingofficial leaders, these people were really laying their
lives on the line in orderto redeem pledges to sacrifice themselves as partof a
social orderthatcalls for such martyrdom.The Iranianrevolutioncame about
throughmilitantbut basically unarmeddemonstrations.The masses acquired
weapons only at the very end when guerrillagroups attackedmilitarydepots
and distributedweapons.
One of the hallmarksof the demonstrationspriorto the shah's departureon
27 Wilfred Madelung, "Imama," Encyclopaedia of Islam (n.s.), III, fasc. 59-60 (Leiden:
Brill, 1971), 1167.
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16 January1979 were the passion plays. These enactmentsreferto the martyrdom of the thirdImam, Husayn, on the battlefieldat the handsof the forces of
the Sunni caliph in A.D. 680. This Imam's cause was rebellionagainst Sunni
impious tyranny. Present-dayrenditionsof his story have clear implications
for the legitimacy of the currentIranianregime, since the passion plays have
allegoricalvalue. People who are martyredfor Husayn'scause are considered
to be worthy themselves of the Imam's primordialsacrifice.
Such mass actions of collective social protestby demonstratorsinspiredby
passion plays constitutedefforts to be worthy of the Imam's truston the part
of the faithful, who thereby proved themselves membersof an exalted community. To non-Shi'ites these actions may appearirrational.If the sacrifices
are deemed a means for actuating the mechanism of solidarity within the
community, however, they appearas structurallyessential in protectingloyalty groups against disintegration.28
The official "high religion" of Shi'ism has little to do with passionplaysa fact that did not deter AyatullahKhumaynifrom utilizing them in mobilizing the masses. Michael Fischer is essentially correct in arguing that the
collective action of Iraniansfrom October 1977 to February1979 compriseda
giant morality play on the national level.29 The climax in such plays is the
imam's martyrdom,but the triggeringmechanismof martyrdomis the repeated question of participants:"May I be your ransom?"In the Christiantradition, the sacrifice of one leads to the salvation of all. The Shi'i tradition
requiresthat the sacrifice be borne equally.
Thus, revolutionarymobilizationstemmednot from ideationalresponsesto
abstractdoctrinalelements. Instead, it derived from the conjunctureof two
factors: (1) the latitude the doctrine provided to the mujtahidsto pronounce
social criticism of impiety, and (2) the catharticfunctionof the passion play.
The revolutionoccurredboth because the masses wantedto improvetheirlife
chances and because they were engaging in concrete, practical, and-for
them-stable reactions to maintainthe integrityof their community. Simultaneously, Ayatullah Khumayni'suse of dramaturgicalsymbols and his own
occultationfrom society as an exile for fifteen years providedpowerful leverage for revolutionaryaction.
REVOLUTIONARY

FACTIONALISM

Factions and splits have characterizedthe Iranianrevolution. The cleavages
are characteristicnot only of relationsbetween clerical and seculargroups, as
might be expected, but within the clergy itself. It is the latter which will
28 Hans Kippenburg, "Jeder Tag 'Ashura, Jedes Grab Kerbala," in Religion und Politik im
Iran: MardomNameh-Jahrbuch zur Geschichte und Gesellschaft des MittlerenOrients, Kurt
Greussing, ed. (Frankfurtam Main: Syndikat, 1981), 217-56.
29 Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution(Cambridge:Harvard
University Press, 1980), 183.
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receive attentionhere. In discussing such factionalism, it will be seen thatthe
traditionallabels of "leftist" and "rightist" do not serve the purpose of
analysis very well. Principledcoalitions, in the sense of groupadherenceto an
internallyconsistent set of positions, have been difficult to identify.
In discussing tactics, strategy, and policies since the revolution, one of the
most importantpoints to bear in mind is thatthe clergy did not have a political
partyuntil after the seizure of power. The organizationalweapon, as it were,
wielded by Ayatullah Khumayni and his associates up to the time of the
shah's departureconsisted of the informalnetworkof urban-basedpreachers
and theological seminary students.
Upon his return to Iran, Khumayni supplementedthis network with the
RevolutionaryCouncil (RC). Though the numericalbalance between clergy
and laymen in the RC favored the second group, the formerremainedmuch
more unified. The RC soon became a forumof conflict between the adherents
of former PresidentAbu al-Hasan Bani Sadr and Ayatullah Sayyid Muhammad Bihishti (in many respects the eminence grise of the regime). Although
conflict between the two men and their respective associates was not continuous, their differences were substantiveand covered mattersof ideology, strategy, tactics, and policy.
The RC had five separatechairmen through its nineteen months of existence. As many as twenty individualsserved on it over this time, but membership apparentlynever exceeded twelve or thirteen at any given time. The
members of the RC included (1) Ayatullah MurtazaMutahhari(first chairman), (2) Ayatullah MuhammadRiza Mahdavi Kani (second chairman),(3)
Ayatullah Mahmud Taliqani (third chairman), (4) Ayatullah Muhammad
Bihishti (fourthchairman), (5) Abu al-HasanBani Sadr (fifth chairman),(6)
Ayatullah Husayn 'Ali Muntaziri (Khumayni's supposedly designated successor), (7) Ayatullah 'Abd al-Karim Musavi Ardabili, (8) Hujjat al-Islam
JavadBahunar,(9) Hujjatal-IslamMuhammad'Ali Khamanah'i,(10) Hujjat
al-Islam 'Ali Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani,(11) 'Abbas Shaybani, (12) Husayn
Musavi Khamanah'i, (13) Mustafa Katira'i, (14) Mihdi Bazargan, (15)
'IzzatullahSahabi, (16) IbrahimYazdi, (17) HasanIbrahimHabibi, (18) 'Ali
AkbarMu'infar, and (19) Sadiq Qutbzadah.
Of the clergymen, only Mutahhariand Taliqanihad ties to the secularleft.
The departureof these two mujtahidsin April and June 1979 respectively,
Mutahharithroughassassinationand Taliqanivia absense before his death in
September, left the RC clergy united under Bihishti's guidance.
The coalitions within the RC apparentlydivided themselves along the following lines. Kani, Bihishti, Muntaziri, Ardabili, Bahunar, M. A.
Khamanah'i,Rafsanjani, Shaybani, and H. M. Khamanah'ibelieved in (1)
restrictingpolitical power to a self-designatedelite (the clergy), (2) curtailing
demandsfor autonomyby minorities, (3) encouragingactivism by the clergy
in mattersof public morality, and in legislative, judicial, and executive mat-
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ters. These are essentially "rightist" positions. But this group may also
reasonablybe said to have advocated (1) distributingthe goods, values, and
services of society more equitably, (2) seeking to enfranchisenew groups in
society, and especially the urban poor, (3) encouraging nationalizationof
certain enterprises, (4) acknowledging at least the principle of worker participationin the makingof managementdecisions in the factories, (5) extricating the Iranianeconomy from the world capitalistsystem, and (6) expropriating propertyand redistributingit to the needy.
Similarly, Bani Sadr, Bazargan,Sahabi, and Yazdi might be termed "leftists" because they arguedfor (1) widening the scope of individualchoice and
access to the levers of power, (2) equitable distributionof goods, services,
and values, (3) extensive enfranchisementfor the downwardlymobile, (4)
state interventionin the economy, (5) backing for workers'councils in enterprises, (6) extensive economic nationalization, and (7) disengaging Iran's
economy from the internationalpolitical economy of capitalism.On the other
hand, at other times and in varying degrees, they also urged (1) restricting
autonomy for Iran's nationalities and minorities, (2) backing the clergy's
activism in the legislative and judicial branchesof government, and (3) instituting measures of censorship against the opposition.
Of the remaining members of the RC, perhaps Katira'i aligned himself
more with the "rightists," while Habibi, Mu'infar, and Qutbzadahleaned
more toward the "leftists." In this framework,these four individualsmight
have represented swing votes. During their short tenure on the council,
Ayatullahs Mutahhariand Taliqani probably supportedthe "leftists" on a
numberof issues.
We have no idea of how the RC made policy. Its spokesman, Habibi,
certainly never gave any public statements about proceduralor substantive
issues. We have, thus, to infer positions from events. For example, from
December 1979 throughJanuary1980 the northwesternprovinceof Azarbayjan was in turmoil over clashes between the adherentsof the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the supportersof Ayatullah MuhammadKazim
Shari'atmadari,an eminentAzari mujtahidresidentin Qumm.A delegationof
the RC (AyatullahKani, Bani Sadr, and Bazargan)went to Qummto consult
with Shari'atmadari,who is the spiritualleaderof most Azarbayjanis.According to the RC alliances outlinedabove, the delegationwas "leftward" leaning
and thereforewould be expected to have been sympatheticto the demandsof
the Azari minority. An arrangementwas reached that was apparentlyagreeable to Shari'atmadari.Yet, Shari'atmadarisoon denounced the "lack of
implementation"of the plan he thought he had achieved with the trio and
warned of civil war "if a single hair of the accord" were out of place.30
30 Iran Times (hereaftercited as IT), 23 and 30 Azar 1358 H. Sh./14 and 21 December 1979.
This paper, published weekly in Washington, D.C., typically consists of fourteen pages in
Persian and two pages in English. All references to IT are to the Persianlanguage articles.
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In keeping with its general policy towardthe nationalities,the RC majority
apparentlyprevailedto preventthe carryingout of its own delegation's agreement with Shari'atmadari.A clue to what went wrong may lie in Bani Sadr's
trenchantrejection of Kurdish autonomy demands in February 1980.31 In
short, actors do not always behave strictly accordingto the labels ascribedto
them. Moreover, positions may change over time, and assigning someone to a
social action category on the basis of his later behavior (in this case, Bani
Sadr's post-February1980 sympathiesfor the Kurds)risks errorsin analysis.
The following issues have divided the leadership in the last four years:
nationalitiespolicy and communalrelations, due process of law, civil rights,
financial policy, constitutional issues, autocracy, corruption,relations with
other powers, economic development, and education policy. Limitationsof
space prohibitdetailed investigation of all of these areas, and the discussion
below will thereforebe confined to the main outline of only a few of them.
INTRACLERGY

CONFLICT

In the period before the shah's departure,intraclergyconflict alreadyexisted.
The divisions deepened subsequently, as a hardline (tundru) position
crystalizedagainst a moderate(miyanahru)one. These cleavages can best be
viewed in the respective arguments of Ayatullahs Khumayni and
Shari'atmadari.32

An initial object of contention was the new political structure.Ayatullah
Shari'atmadarihad supporteda broadly formulatedquestion for the March
1979 referendumon the futurepolitical system of the country.Ultimately,the
narrow formulation demanded by Ayatullah Khumayni and his supporters,
(Do you favor an Islamic Republic? Yes or no?) prevailed over Shari'atmadari'spreferredversion (Whatkind of political system do you want for the
country?).
Second, Shari'atmadariearly had permitted his followers to establish a
political party-the Muslim People's Party (MPP)-rival to the IRP, which
had the supportof the urbanmasses. Before its suppressionin late 1979, MPP
adherents, who were mainly from Azarbayjan,had broadly criticized many
aspects of IRP policies and actions.
Third, Shari'atmadariconsistently used terms such as national, nationalist,
democratic, sovereignty, whereas Khumaynieven more consistently anathematized them as Western terms intendedto undermineShi'ism.
Fourth, Shari'atmadariurged that a constituentassembly be convened to
debate a new constitution. He strongly insisted that this body comprise duly
elected representativesof the broad masses of the people. Khumaynicountered with the narrowlybased Council of Experts, to be dominatedby IRP
31 IT, 3 Isfand 1358 H. Sh./22
February1980.
32 An examination of the conflicts between
Khumayni and Shari'atmadarimay be found in
Akhavi, Religion and Politics, 172-80.
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clergy. The latter carried the day, with predictableconsequences for provisions favored by Shari'atmadarion questions of power and sovereignty.
A fifth issue separatingthe two grand mujtahidswas that of freedom of
association, speech, and the press. Shari'atmadarireasoned that dissonant
views could be boycotted but should not be violently suppressed.The matter
arose over the famous Ayandigan affair, in which that newspaper linked
existence of a terroristorganization, Furqan, to religious motivations. The
publicationof materialon Furqan'sideology and activities, withouthowever
any accompanyingeditorialcomment, releaseda flood of accusationsby IRPoriented clergy. Khumayni himself led IRP denunciationsof the paper for
printingwhat he regardedas anticlergypropaganda.In the end, a violent mob
attackon the paper's plant led to casualties, the destructionof property,and
the suspension of publicationfor a numberof weeks. After a brief returnto
the newsstands under chastened circumstances, the paper was completely
taken over by the IRP and renamedAzadigan.
The divergence between the views of Khumayniand Shari'atmadariwidened in 1980 until the lattereitherwas compelled or voluntarilywithdrewinto
silence. Perhapsthe most critical disagreementhas been over the new constitution, approvedin a December 1979 referendum,which transformedIran
into a theocraticstate.33Shari'atmadari'sbasic objectionto the draftconstitution submittedto the nationby the Councilof Expertsstemmedfrom his belief
that articles 5 and 110, pertaining to the power of the faqih (the supreme
clerical leader), and the provisions of articles 6 and 56, relating to national
sovereignty, contravenedone another.Shari'atmadaritrenchantly,if politely,
maintained that Shi'i doctrine has no provision at all for the principle of
vilayat-ifaqih (rule exercised on behalf of the imam by the supremeclergyman). Practicallyspeaking, the need for afaqih can arise underextraordinary
circumstances,he conceded. But once a chief executive is installed, a parliament is elected, and the governmentreceives the latter's vote of confidence,
then the need for afaqih lapses. Yet, the draftconstitutionrenderedthe office
offaqih a permanentfixtureof the political system. In Shari'atmadari'sview,
however, even during the state of emergency the faqih's powers must be
restricted, especially by assigning command of the armed forces to an
accountable government official. Failing that, the problem of autocracy
would arise once again.34
These argumentscontrastedsharplywith the views expressedby Ayatullah
Khumayni in his 1971 book, Islamic Government. There, he consistently
demands clergy activism in politics, citing a hadith attributedto Imam 'Ali
concerningthe prophet'ssupplicationto God to bless those coming afterhim.
Asked who will be his successors, the prophethad responded, "Those who
33 Constitutionof the Islamic Republic of Iran, Middle East Journal, 34:2 (Spring 1980),
184-204.
34 Khalq-i Musalman, 22 Mihr 1358 H. Sh./14 October 1979.
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come after me who transmitmy sayings and traditionsand teach them to the
people in my absence."35 Khumayni holds that the prophet intended the
active teaching of his precepts to secure a dynamic and activist role for the
men of religion in Islam. This was tantamountto a doctrinal directive for
social action by the clergy.
But Shari'atmadari-this time joined by the immensely popularTaliqanidemurred, countering that in his opinion clergy activism had produced so
many problems that he appealedto them to returnto the mosques.36As if to
underlinethat this statement was not fortuitous, he repeated it four months
later, adding for good measurethat to his mind the high clergy ought to avoid
commerce, as well.37
On the role of educators, Ayatullah Shari'atmadariinformed a group of
visiting university professors at a time particularlytrying for them that no
groupin society could serve it betterthantheirs.38By contrast,Khumaynihas
furiously demandeda purge of the universities, condemningthem for harboring what he has termed communists, American agents, and imperialists.39
On the Kurdishquestion, Shari'atmadarialigned himself with the RC emissary, Ayatullah Taliqani, who stood for negotiation and reconciliationwith
the Kurds.40 Khumayni, however, rejected Taliqani's recommendations,
linked the Maoist Komela with the Kurdish Democratic Party in an undifferentiated "communist" alliance, and sent the Iranian revolutionary
guardsinto the Kurdishcities. His feelings on this issue were so strongthathe
threatenedto bring these guards before the revolutionarycourts should they
fail to suppress the Kurdish movement.4'
Differences between the pair arose, too, on the taking of the American
hostages. To Shari'atmadari,the action correspondedwith revolutionarypraxis, but not with the laws and prescriptionsof Islam.42He held this view in the
face of Khumayni's anti-Americanspeeches during the week preceding the
embassy capture. Khumayni's subsequent comments that the embassy had
been a "nest of spies" and his warningsabout imminentAmericanintervention suggest that the action had his approvalonce it had taken place.
35 Ruhullahal-Musavi Khumayni,Hukumat-iIslami (Najaf:Ashraf, 1391 H. Q./1971), 74ff.
Emphasis supplied.
36 IT, 18 Khurdad1358 H. Sh./8 June 1979; 4 Aban 1358/26 October 1979.
37 IT, 4 Aban 1358 H. Sh./26 October 1979.
38 IT, 18 Aban 1358 H. Sh./9 November 1979.
39 Iranshahr, 4 Urdibihisht1359 H. Sh./24 April 1980; IT, 30 Aban 1359 H. Sh./21 November 1980; IT, 5 Day 1359 H. Sh./26 December 1980; IT, 25 Urdibihisht 1360 H. Sh./15 May
1981. Although clearly opposed to communism, Ayatullah Shari'atmadarihas declared, as
against Ayatullah Khumayni's position, "If the people should elect communists as representatives, it will be necessary to tolerate their existence." Ayandigan, 30 Tir 1358 H. Sh./21 July
1979.
40 Khalq-i Musalman, 22 Mihr 1358 H. Sh./14 October 1979.
41 IT, 16 Shahrivar 1358 H. Sh./7
September 1979.
42 IT, 9 Azar 1358 H. Sh./30 November 1979.
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Otherelements of difference between the grandmujtahidsinclude Shari'atmadari's rebukes to IRP officials for seeking to monopolize power and for
spreadinga climate of revenge in the country.43For Khumayni, monolithic
unity appearsas a categoricalimperative,sustainedby his threatsto purgethe
bazaars, the ranks of the revolutionaryguards, and even the revolutionary
courts should they fail to evince sufficient revolutionarymilitance. His militance informs even his more conciliatory moments, as when he appealedto
dissenting clergymen to unite in the new regime to prevent "those sitting in
Paris" from overthrowingthe Islamic Republic. If these clerics did not desist,
Khumayniadmonished,the masses would know where duty lay in the face of
their "treason."44
Denying Khumayni's charge that the regime's problems were attributable
to agents of imperialism,communism, and Zionism, Shari'atmadari
ironically
expressed his hope that the three million membersof the MPP were not all
"foreign agents."45 Shari'atmadari'sgreatermoderationemergednot only in
the context of his appealto the IRP to let non-IRPgroupsoperatein the open.
It ultimately encompassed the question of the fate of the shah. To him, the
physical returnof the shah to Iran was unimportant,provided the wealth he
had taken out of the country were restored to the Iranian people.46 But
AyatullahKhumayni's position was that the revolutionwould never be consummatedwithoutputtingthe shah on trialand revealingthe truenatureof his
rule to the world. A trial, for him, would markthe end of Westernpenetration, expurgatepast sins, and provide funds for developmentpurposes.
A number of other senior and junior clergymen also expressed dismay,
anger, and criticism against the clergy leaders of the IRP. In some cases, the
criticism was merely implied, as, for example, when Ayatullah Taliqani
actually boycotted the meetings of the RC in the monthsprecedinghis death,
despite his incumbency as its chairman.47
In otherinstances, even relativesof AyatullahKhumaynihave lashed out at
what they termedexcesses of the hardlinegroup. Thus, Khumayni'sbrother,
AyatullahMurtazaPasandidah,objected to balloting irregularitiesin the parliamentaryelections in the spring of 1980. In riposte, the IRP Speaker of
Parliament accused him of conspiring with the United States against the
Islamic Republic.48 Earlier, Khumayni's son, Hujjat al-Islam Ahamd Khu43 IT, 30 Azar 1358 H. Sh./21 December 1979.

44 IT, 14 Shahrivar 1359 H. Sh./5 September 1980; IT, 14 Farvardin1360 H. Sh./3 April
1981; IT, 25 Urdibihisht 1360 H. Sh./15 May 1981.
45 IT, 23 Azar 1358 H. Sh./14 December 1979. Suggesting that these individualsare patriots,
Shari'atmadariagain took issue with Ayatullah Khumayni's rejection of nationalistsentiment
when he declared, "Love of one's homeland is a sound idea-a person's homelandis like his
house." Ittila'at, 20 Khurdad1358 H. Sh./10 June 1979.
46 IT, 30 Azar 1358 H. Sh./21 December 1979.
47 IT, 27 Mihr 1358 H. Sh./19 October 1979.
48 IT, 15 Farvardin1359 H. Sh./4 April 1980.
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mayni, had spoken againstthe principleof vilayat-ifaqih duringthe deliberations on the draft constitutionby the Council of Experts.49
A more direct challenge came from AyatullahKhumayni'sgrandson,Hujjat al-Islam Husayn Khumayni, who openly declared that 90 percent of the
Iranianclergy rejectedthe IRP faction and were in supportof the then President Bani Sadr against it. Warning against the possibility of a "Chile-type
dictatorship," he delivered the charge that the members of this faction had
"proven themselves fascists whose actions had broughtthe state to the verge
of collapse."50

But more serious are the defections from the IRP line which have occurred
among highly influential and respected mujtahidswith records of activities
against the shah. In Mashhad, the country's second holy city, Ayatullah
Hasan Taba'taba'iQummi accused the IRP 'ulama' (clergy) of having "lost
their way from the true Islam." In his view, ignorant,corrupt,and merciless
officials controlled the revolutionarycourts, and unless a purge of state institutions were undertakento eliminate the IRP's role there, matterswould
continue to worsen. Ayatullah KhumayniindirectlyrebuttedQummi's statements by linking anti-IRPclergy in Qumm and Mashhadto the shah's counterrevolutionaryactivities and threateningthem with action by revolutionary
tribunals. Undeterred, Qummi angrily judged the constitutionto be in violation of Islamic law and held articles 107-112, relatingto the powers of the
faqih and other 'ulama', to be mutuallycontradictory.5'
Comments from other senior mujtahids have been equally negative, although in some cases the tone has been milder than in others. The popular
teacherof Qumm's madrasahs, AyatullahNasir MakarimShirazi, early criticized the concept of vilayat-i faqih in deliberationswithin the Council of
Experts. Attempting to reject the principle without condemning Ayatullah
Khumayni, Shiraziwarnedagainst the concentrationof power and autocracy.
Recalling that essentially unarmedmasses had successfully made the revolution, Makarimsubtly arguedthat makingthefaqih commander-in-chiefof the
armedforces would be a violation of the trustaccruingto the Iranianpeople.
After all, if armed might were a legitimate means of maintaininga political
system, then the shah would still be in power.52
In blunterlanguage, AyatullahAbu al-Fazl Musavi Zanjanicondemnedthe
"despotic power" vested in thefaqih.53 His brother,AyatullahRiza Musavi
49 IT, 4 Aban 1358 H. Sh./26 October 1979. It is true he did so on technical, not substantive,
grounds. If, as was possible, the faqih were not an Iranian, what would he do in case of war
between Iran and his home country, given that he would be commander-in-chiefof the armed
forces? If he were to order Iranianmobilization, he would be warringagainsthis own country;if
he demurred,he would be a traitorto Iran.
50
IT, 14 Farvardin1360 H. Sh./3 April 1981; IT, 4 Urdibihisht1360 H. Sh./24 April 1981.
51 IT, 1 Farvardin1360 H. Sh./21 March 1981.
52
Khalq-i Musalman, 22 Mihr 1358/14 October 1979.
53 Voice of America, Persian language broadcast, 22 March 1981.
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Zanjani,a supporterof formerPrimeMinisterMusaddiqand havingclose ties
to the then late AyatullahTaliqani,denouncedthe "murderscommittedin the
name of Islam" during the revolution. Referringto the visit by Ayatullahs
Mahallatiand Qummi to the home of AyatullahKhumaynito submita list of
clergy grievancesto the latter, he ironicallyconcluded, "but they left without
results."54
A second distinguished member of the Mashhad 'ulama' who has been
vocal in his criticism of the IRP is Hujjatal-Islam 'Ali Tihrani;despite his
evident standing within the religious institutionin the country, Tihrani has
repeatedly forbidden his followers to call him Ayatullah. To his mind,
AyatullahKhumaynihad "trampledupon Islam" and ignoredhis ownfatwas
in what Tihranisaw to be calculatedmoves to retainpower. Tihranirebuked
Khumaynifor suggesting that the Qur'ancontainedan exhaustivediscussion
of the Islamic law of retaliation,noting that even were that true, it would be
"obscene" to have parliamentenact those provisions, as though the Qur'an
requiredratificationby positive law. Tihranialso joined the issue of the extent
of popularclerical supportfor the IRP, declaring:
Thisgroupis merelya smallminorityunderthe leadershipof AyatullahBihishti.
withtheir
Theyarenotthe realclergymenof the Shi'iriteof Islam.I amconversant
past and know that they have not even acquireda sound religious education .... All

genuineclergymenopposethemandhavekeptsilentonlyoutof respectforAyatullah
Khumayni. . . . [The IRP's] supportersin reality are a groupof fourteenpersonswho

teachin Qumm.Mostof themare not realteachersandcannoteven be considered
specialistsin Islamicsciences.Qumm'srealteachers,who numbermorethanthree

hundred,oppose the IRP. . . . Even the group of fourteenhas split and some of them

have now joinedthe circleof Ayatullah[Muhammad
Riza]Gulpaygani[oneof the
country'seminentmujtahids].55
Criticismsof the IRP by senior clergymen have not been localized. Mashhad, Tabriz, and Shiraz appear as main centers of contention against the
behavior of that faction's members. This is bound to be worrisome for the
regime, given the historic importance of those three cities in the political
history of the country.56
In Mashhad,AyatullahAbu al-HasanShirazihas blamedthe variousrevolutionaryorgans for "directly or indirectlycausing convulsions," maintaining that "circumstanceshave slowly become worse thanbefore. People have
become desperate and are asking each other: 'Where can we turn to?' "57
In a similar vein, the pro-Shari'atmadarimujtahidof Tabriz, Ayatullah
Yusuf Hashimi Hukmabadi,remonstrated:"With the things that people are
54 IT, 2 Murdad 1360 H. Sh./24 July 1981.
55 IT, 26 Tir 1360 H. Sh./17 July 1981; IT, 9 Murdad 1360 H. Sh./31 July 1981.
56 Denouncing the concentrationof power in Qumm, Ayatullah Abu al-Hasan Shirazi of
Mashhadremindedhis audience thathis city was the site of the tomb of the eighth Imam, a claim
no other Iraniancity could make. IT, 28 Farvardin1360 H. Sh./17 April 1981.
57 IT, 25 Urdibihisht 1360 H. Sh./15 May 1981.
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doing, not only will infidels not become Muslims, but Muslims will flee
Islam."58 In Shiraz, Ayatullah Baha' al-Din Mahallati, an old ally of Khumayni during the 1963 disturbances, broadly condemned the regime elite,
saying, "Right now, in the Islamic country of Iran, demagoguery, idolatry,
severe repression, fraud, flattery, tamperingwith [others'] ideas, statements
and writings, bribery, obscenities, mendacity and recriminationsare wildly
circulating."59
And within the regime itself, factional rifts have emerged among the clergy. One of the reasons for clergy rebellion against the shah had been his
failure ever to implement article 2 of the old constitution, which had stipulated the creation of a council of mujtahids to certify the compatibility of
legislation with Islamic law. An early action, therefore, by Ayatullah Khumayni, was to appoint six mujtahidsdirectly to a new revolutionaryinstitution, the Council of Guardiansof the Constitution,and to approvethe nomination of six others by his colleagues. Among his own nominees was his old
colleague and ally from the period of antishah activities, Ayatullah Rabani
Shirazi. The Council of Guardianshas in fact repeatedlyrejected IRP land
reform legislation on the grounds that Islamic law categoricallyprotectsprivate ownership of property.After many months of deadlock, the IRP leadership prevailedon AyatullahKhumaynito intervene, and he has vested parliament with certain of his powers as faqih, empowering the legislature to
overridethe objections of the Council of Guardians.This has caused significant deepening in the cleavages within the IRP faction itself, as certain IRP
stalwarts have become disenchanted with the party's basic policy on land
tenure.60
Despite these defections from the IRP line, members of the IRP faction
have continued to dominate political power. The leaders of the IRP clergy
have included AyatullahHusayn 'Ali Muntaziri(Khumayni'sdesignatedsuccessor), Ayatullah Bihishti (killed in June 1981), Ayatullah Yahya Nuri,
Ayatullah 'Ali Qudusi (revolutionaryprosecutor-generaluntil his assassination in September 1981), Ayatullah 'Abd al-KarimArdabili(chairmanof the
State Supreme Court), and Ayatullah Kani.
Below this tier of senior clergymen have been Hujjatal-Islam Rafsanjani,
Hujjatal-Islam Javad Bahunar(prime minister), Hujjatal-Islam Muhammad
'Ali Khamanah'i(president).In the thirdechelon are the preachers,influential
mobilizersof mass opinion and social action:Hujjatal-IslamSadiqKhalkhali,
leaderof the militantfundamentalistmovement, the Fida'iyan-iIslam, with its
connection to the lutis (street toughs) and activists known as the hizbullahi
(those of the Partyof God); and Hujjatal-Islam Hadi Ghafari,now deceased,
58 Khalq-i Musalman, 22 Mihr 1358 H. Sh./14 October 1979.
59 IT, 25 Urdibihisht 1360 H. Sh./15 May 1981.
60 IT, 1 Aban 1360 H. Sh./23 October 1981.

218

SHAHROUGH

AKHAVI

who had threatenedanti-IRPmembers of parliamentwith assassinationand
acquireda certainfollowing. Two other tertiaryclerical leadersmay be mentioned: Hujjat al-Islam MuhammadTaqi Falsafi, a strongly anti-Musaddiq
preacherhaving close ties to clerical circles identifiedwith the late Ayatullah
Abu al-Qasim Kashani(d. 1962), himself a militantactivist in the late 1940s
and early 1950s; and finally, Hujjat al-Islam MuhammadKhu'ayniha,spiritual guide of the "students of the Imam's line," that is, of those who
capturedthe American diplomats and the embassy in November 1979. His
importanceis reflected in the rapid rise of his clients to positions of importance in the revolutionaryregime, especially in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the intelligence service.61
Organizationally,the IRP was the instrumentof Ayatullah Bihishti. He
utilized his supportersin the IRP in a pragmaticmannerto establishthe party
as the most powerful institution outside the state. Withal, Bihishti was not
able consistently to control IRP members, especially individuals such as
Khalkhali,who had theirown independentbase of support.His organizational
talents apparentlyoverrode any suspicions that may have existed among his
colleagues aboutthe loose natureof his ideological commitments.Such suspicions had derived from his contacts with the shah's clients before the revolution, his contacts with officials of the American State Department,and his
meeting with General Robert Huyser, whom President Jimmy Carter had
dispatchedto Iranin December 1978.62Moreover, he seemed to be inconsistent on the issue of the hostages, speakingof the need to free them, trying to
prevent their transferinto government custody (in an attemptto embarrass
Bani Sadr), and finally urging that they be tried.63
Bihishti's calculationsfor the organizationof power were predicatedon his
beliefs thatthe clergy would not long maintainthe unquestionedloyalty of the
masses; the clergy should rapidly establish a theocracy;the 'ulama' ought to
cast the "liberals" (that is, Bani Sadr, Bazargan, Yazdi, Nazih, and others)
as the scapegoats for regime failures; and the Soviet Union would avoid
entanglement in Iran because of the Afghan and Polish crises. In the last
analysis, Bihishti remained a nondoctrinaireleader, whereas his successors
are more sectarianand dogmatic while lacking his organizationalabilities.64
In Bihishti's absence, the IRP has proceeded in a somewhat rudderless
fashion. Conflicts between so-called Maktabiand Hujjatifactions have split
the party since his death. As already noted, disagreementshave divided the
TRPover land reform. Beyond this conflict may be mentioned the growing
61 IT, 2 Bahman 1360 H. Sh./22 January 1982.
62 IT, 10 Isfand 1358 H. Sh./29 February1980; IT, 4 Mihr 1359 H. Sh./26 September1980;
IT, 20 Tir 1359 H. Sh./ll July 1980.
63 IT, 13 Tir 1359 H. Sh./4 July 1980;IT, 14 Shahrivar1359 H. Sh./5 September1980;IT, 1
Farvardin1359 H. Sh./21 March 1980.
64 IT, 19 Tir 1360 H. Sh./10 July 1981.
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disenchantmentof the parliamentaryIRP memberswith the cabinet IRP figures over the nonimplementationof legislation. Such enactmentsas the laws
on allowable activities of political parties, on doctor-patientrelations,and on
purges of ancien regime officials in the state apparatushave gone without
implementation.Demands for a governmentreporton the action of the Foundationfor the Deprived in its administrationof corporationsand factorieshave
gone unheeded.65While it would be inappropriateto label this conflict one of
"left" (the parliamentaryIRP) against "right" (the cabinet IRP), it does
appearas thoughrevolutionarymilitanceis reflectedin the legislature'spraxis
while the governmentstrives for a breathingspell of relaxationin revolutionary zeal.66
CONCLUSIONS

This article has examined both the ideology and praxis of Shi'ism in the
revolutionwhich producedthe Islamic Republicof Iran. It has suggestedthat
the revolutionwas the productof threefactors:(1) certaindoctrinaltrendsthat
have permittedgreat involvement of the religious leadershipin politics, (2)
popular and dramaturgicalelements of Shi'ism which relate to the social
integrationof the community, and (3) political expressionand social actionby
individualsand organizationsin reactionto structuralchanges in society, in a
context where the respective interpretationsof Shi'ism, corporateinterests,
and the public good have varied widely.
Born out of protest against the Pahlavi corporatiststate, the revolutionhas
provided grounds for confrontation and controversy among those who actively broughtit about. The new theocraticstate certainlyreversedthe trend,
prominent in the post-1963 period, toward increasing bureaucratizationof
power. The new state structurediffers from the old in a double sense: it is, so
far, weakerthan its predecessor,but its leaders also aspireto have it penetrate
the lives of the people more extensively thanits counterpartunderthe shah. In
any revolution, of course, the state is at least originally weakened, and
whetheror not the theocraticstate orderof the Islamic Republicwill be able to
organizethe lives of Iraniansaccordingto desiredpatternsof equality, capacity, solidarity, and stability cannot yet be determined.
What is clear is that the clergy have acted in a mannerunprecedentedin
Iran's history. While doctrine providedsanction to the clergy's role as mem65 IT, 18 Day 1360 H. Sh./8 January1982.
66 Since the original draft of this article was written, the situation has reversed. The more
militant IRP faction is now dominantin the cabinet and partyorgans (Politburo,GeneralSecretariat, CentralCommittee). The less militantappearin significantnumbersin the parliamentand
judiciary. See ShahroughAkhavi, "Clerical Politics in Iransince 1979" in TheIranian Revolution and the Islamic Republic: New Assessments, Nikki Keddie and Kathleen Manalo, eds.
(Washington,D.C.: The Middle East Institute,forthcoming).This essay was originallypresented
as a paper to the Conference on the IranianRevolution and the Islamic Republic, Smithsonian
Institution, Woodrow Wilson Center, 22-23 May 1982.
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bers of the generalagency (al-wikalahal-'ammah), social actionby the clergy
since 1978 has, by going as far as the assumptionof executive leadership
positions in the state administration,transcendedthe limits the 'ulama' set for
themselves in earlier times. In the process, much controversyhas emerged
over doctrinalprinciplesand the uses to which such principleshave been put
in practice.
Parallelingthese disputes has been the clergy's stimulation,by word and
deed, of the messianic expectationsof IranianShi'ites. The passion play has
played a centralrole in the dynamics of the Iranianrevolution.Its message is
unambiguous,unlike the difficult and in a sense stylized intellectualdiscourse
of the mujtahidsover the Imamate, vilayat, and impious rule. The principles
at the center of these concepts furnishedthe clergy with the tactical power
needed to mobilize the masses. But the messianic elements and themes provided the operationalmechanism of the mobilization.
The very high degree of factionalism exhibited by social actors in the
Iranianrevolutionis complicated, furthermore,by the tendencyof individuals
to have differing orientationswithin a particular("leftist," "moderate," or
"rightist") perspective. Thus, on a variety of issues, including communal
relations, due process, civil rights, constitutionalism,autocracy,corruption,
and intraeliterelations, a high level of conflict has been characteristicof the
last five years.
This essay may have conveyed the impressionthat the Iranianrevolution
has been somehow principallyaboutShi'ism. Such a conclusionis inaccurate.
Thereis no attempthere to say or imply thatShi'ism "caused" the revolution.
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber wrote,
We haveno intentionwhateverof maintaining
sucha foolishanddoctrinaire
thesisas
thatthe spiritof capitalism. . . couldonly havearisenas theresultof certaineffects
of the Reformation.... [W]e only wish to ascertainwhetherand to whatextent
formation
andthequantitative
religiousforceshavetakenpartin thequalitative
expansion of thatspiritoverthe world.67
The same thought applies, mutatis mutandis, in the presentessay. The only
intent is to determinethe natureof the clergy's role in the revolutionand to
account for their mutual relations during its course.
Shi'ism has proven a difficult concept and practice for the sociologist of
religion to grasp. Like the proverbialblind men trying to fathom the identity
of the elephant they are touching, the social actors in the Iranianrevolution
also appearto be reachingdifferentconclusions. In the process, they seem to
be alteringtheirdiscourse, as well. Simultaneously,shifting and even unprincipled coalitions, which have characterizedthe social realityof the revolution
since its inception, continue to appear.The analyst of the Iranianrevolution,
67 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1958), 91.
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therefore, can only try to record the variationsand seek explanationof their
meaning in the culturaland social contexts of Iranianhistory. What remains
certain is that the social actors have not only attributedwidely differing
meanings to a corpus of doctrinethat has evolved over the centuries,but, just
as important, their modes of behavior have been so divergent that it often
comes as a surpriseto recall that Shi'ism is, after all, their common point of
reference.

